Episode 32: Electoral Reform (Part 2)

1.0 Introduction

Following the previous Law Series, several critical issues in Malaysia’s electoral system were discussed, including malapportionment, the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) voting system, and gerrymandering. These issues have resulted in significant disparities in political representation, undermining the principle of equal voting power and skewing electoral outcomes in favour of particular parties or regions. Malapportionment leads to unequal voter influence across constituencies, while the FPTP system can marginalise smaller political parties and distort the overall representation in the Dewan Rakyat. Gerrymandering further exacerbates these issues by manipulating electoral boundaries to benefit specific political interests, thereby compromising the fairness and integrity of the electoral process.

The integrity of our democracy hangs in the balance. These electoral issues are not mere technicalities but fundamental threats to the core principle of equal representation. Malapportionment, gerrymandering, and flawed voting systems distort the democratic process, allowing the powerful to manipulate outcomes and suppress the will of the people. Resolving these issues is paramount to preventing the abuse of political power, safeguarding transparency, and ensuring that every citizen's vote carries the weight it deserves. By doing so, we can preserve democratic principles, rebuild confidence in our electoral process, and establish a government that accurately represents the wishes of the people.

This month's Law Series will explain several approaches to addressing major electoral problems. These include tackling malapportionment by establishing minimum and maximum constituency sizes and analysing systems such as Germany's Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMP) and Singapore's Group Representation Constituency (GRC) model. Alternatives to the FPTP system that aim for more representative results, such as run-off elections and Ranked Choice Voting, will also be examined. Lastly, measures to prevent gerrymandering, like independent redistricting committees, will be considered to guarantee impartial and equitable boundary delineations.

2.0 Potential Solutions for Malapportionment

Malapportionment occurs when there is inequality in the number of voters across constituencies, undermining voter equality.[1] In Malaysia, the issue of malapportionment has become increasingly severe following the 14th General Election.[2] Moreover, the problem has worsened with the recent implementation of automatic voter registration and Undi18, which were first introduced during the 15th General Election.[3] This segment will primarily focus on analysing and comparing potential electoral systems from other countries for implementation in Malaysia. 

2.1 Group Representation Constituency (GRC)

A Group Representation Constituency (GRC), used exclusively in Singapore, is an electoral division led by a team of multiracial candidates.[4] As Singapore is predominantly Chinese, this election system was introduced during the 1988 general election with the rationale of upholding minority representation.[5] Before the GRC system, Singapore used only Single-Member Constituencies (SMC). Despite the introduction of GRCs, SMCs continue to be used in less populous regions, while GRCs are applied to more populous regions. As of 21 July 2024, a total of 2,715,187 electors in Singapore were registered in 31 electoral divisions under the GRC system.[6]

The GRC system requires each constituency to be represented by a team of three to six candidates.[7] Each team must include at least one member from a minority community.[8] Additionally, candidates in each group must be either members of the same political party or independent candidates running as a group.[9]

Malaysia’s current First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system, which elects one Member of Parliament (MP) for each constituency, can be enhanced by introducing the GRC to address malapportionment. One early stage in integrating the GRC system into Malaysia's electoral framework is by initially introducing it in populous urban constituencies. For example, Bangi, with a total of 303,430[10] registered voters, could be restructured to have two or three MPs representing the same constituency, with each MP accountable for approximately 100,000 voters. This approach would not only ensure equal representation in these areas but also provide an effective solution to the complex issues faced by urban constituencies, where a single MP may struggle to manage responsibilities alone.[11] This indirectly addresses intrastate malapportionment by aligning the number of voters in each constituency with the number of MPs representing the state.

However, the GRC system evaluates candidates as part of a group rather than based on their individual merits. This allows lesser-known candidates to benefit from their association with more popular teammates, potentially reducing fair competition and voter engagement.[12] Additionally, the GRC system creates obstacles for smaller political parties contesting general elections.[13] As the GRC is a group-based system, parties are required to field a larger number of candidates, increasing campaign expenses and recruitment challenges.[14] Furthermore, campaigning in more populous regions benefits larger and more influential parties with greater volunteer support, membership, and resources.

2.2 Mixed-Member Proportional Representation System (MMP)

Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMP) combines the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system and the Party List system, originally introduced in Germany.[15] This approach allows voters to cast two separate votes in an election. The first vote is cast for an individual candidate running in a local constituency, which receives the plurality of votes in each constituency and wins a seat in Parliament.[16] The second vote is cast for a political party, which plays a broader role in shaping the overall makeup of Parliament by utilising the Sainte-Laguë/Schepers method, a proportional representation formula.[17] Hypothetically,  if a party receives 10% of the national vote but does not secure any individual district seats, it will be allocated proportional seats from the proportional representation (PR) list in Parliament.[18] For a party to qualify for representation in Parliament, it must either receive at least 5% of the party vote or obtain a minimum of three individual geographical seats.[19]

As Malaysia already practises FPTP, the main reform needed is the integration of the Party List system. The Party List system aims to balance representation across states, ensuring that Parliament more accurately reflects the overall vote distribution.[20] This reform addresses the issue of overrepresentation and underrepresentation that is often caused by malapportionment, by ensuring that the distribution of parliamentary seats reflects the proportion of votes each party receives. 

The significance of the MMP system to voters lies in its dual benefit. Firstly, it maintains  geographical representation through FPTP votes, allowing voters to elect their chosen local representative.[21] Secondly, the implementation of party lists showcases nationwide perspectives. Even with future changes to the electoral districts (redelineation), this system ensures balanced representation, reflecting the voice of the entire electorate.

However, the MMP system has its challenges. One drawback is that the influence of local MPs may become less significant compared to the party vote in determining the overall distribution of parliamentary seats.[22] Additionally, if a party fails to meet the aforementioned criteria, it will not be represented in Parliament. This can result in wasted votes, as votes cast for smaller parties that fail to meet these thresholds do not contribute to parliamentary representation.[23] 

3.0 Alternatives to the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) System

3.1 Ranked Choice Voting (RCV)

Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) encompasses any voting system where voters rank candidates to elect one or multiple winners. To simplify, imagine you're asked, "Do you prefer coffee or tea?" If you prefer coffee, you'd rank it first, with tea as your second choice. This principle extends to electoral voting. In elections with multiple candidates, voters have preferences, and RCV allows them to express these preferences through a ranked ballot.[24] There are various types of ranked ballots, including those marked by ovals, written names, or numbered preferences. Despite differences in ballot formats, the core principle remains: voters rank candidates according to their preference.

RCV was initially developed in the 1850s as a proportional representation system for multi-winner elections and was later adapted to single-winner elections in the 1870s. It is known by several names, including instant-runoff voting (IRV), preferential voting, proportional representation, and the single transferable vote (STV).[25] While these systems share the principle of ranking preferences, the methods of tabulating and counting votes differ significantly, resulting in varied outcomes.[26] For instance, in IRV and STV systems, lower preferences serve as contingencies and are only considered when higher-ranked candidates are eliminated. Conversely, some systems use ranks as weights, known as positional voting. The Borda method, for example, assigns points to candidates based on their rank, with the candidate receiving the most points winning, thereby reflecting the intensity of voter preference.[27]

Among these systems, instant-runoff voting (IRV) is particularly notable. It has been used for a long time in Australia and more recently adopted by a few states in the United States. The IRV process is straightforward: if a candidate receives more than half of the first-choice votes, they win. If no candidate achieves a majority, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and those votes are redistributed to the voters' next preferences. This process continues until a candidate secures a majority.[28]

RCV is currently utilised in various countries, including the United States and Australia, across numerous jurisdictions. As of the 2022 elections, RCV was adopted in 62 jurisdictions in the United States, including Alaska, Maine, and New York City.[29] This widespread adoption prompts the question: what has sustained RCV's usage over the years, and are there any drawbacks?

The enduring appeal of RCV can be attributed to several benefits. Firstly, RCV identifies the candidate with the broadest support. In elections with multiple candidates, a "most votes wins" system can result in a winner with only a weak plurality. RCV, however, ensures the majority's will is reflected in the outcome.[30] Secondly, RCV fosters more civil campaigning. In RCV elections, candidates are more inclined to attract voters who are not traditionally aligned with them or their party, reducing the incentive for negative campaigning. This has been observed in places like Maine and New York City, where elections became more positive and civil after adopting RCV.[31] Thirdly, RCV minimises wasted votes. Voters no longer need to strategise about the electability of their preferred candidate; they can rank their true preferences without fear of wasting their vote. If their top choice is not viable, their vote transfers to their next choice, ensuring their voice is still heard.[32]

However, RCV is not without its criticisms. One major concern is that RCV is perceived as complicated and expensive due to the multiple rounds of counting. Additionally, some argue that RCV delays the final results, as the process of eliminating candidates and redistributing votes takes longer than a straightforward tally. Another critique is the misconception that RCV violates the principle of "one person, one vote." This principle asserts that each citizen's vote should carry equal weight, ensuring equal political influence. Historically, this principle has been a rallying cry for better representation and equality, especially for disenfranchised groups. Critics of RCV mistakenly argue that allowing voters to rank multiple candidates equates to casting multiple votes. In reality, RCV allows voters to rank candidates, but each voter still casts only one vote. This misunderstanding, though misleading, persists. For example, in 2020, opponents of North Dakota's Measure 3, which included RCV, used this argument to oppose the measure. "One person, one vote" is fundamentally about fairness and ensuring everyone's voice is equally heard. RCV supports this principle by offering a nuanced way for voters to express their preferences, ensuring that the final results accurately reflect the electorate's will without counting any vote more than once.[33]

To encapsulate, Ranked Choice Voting offers a more refined and representative approach to elections, allowing voters to express their true preferences without fear of wasting their vote. While it presents some challenges in complexity and cost, its benefits in promoting majority support, fostering civil campaigns, and reducing wasted votes make it a compelling option for modern democracies. Despite misconceptions and criticisms, RCV upholds the principle of equal representation, ensuring that every vote counts in a meaningful way. 

3.2 Proportional Representation

Proportional Representation (PR) is an electoral system designed to ensure that the composition of the elected body reflects the diverse preferences of the electorate. In this system, the number of seats won by a party or group of candidates is proportionate to the number of votes received.[34] 

To understand PR better, let's consider a simple analogy involving a pizza party where everyone votes on their favorite toppings. Imagine there are three topping choices: pepperoni, mushrooms, and pineapple. In a FPTP system, the topping with the most votes would cover the entire pizza. So, if 40% of the participants vote for pepperoni, 30% for mushrooms, and 30% for pineapple, the entire pizza would end up being pepperoni, ignoring the preferences of the mushroom and pineapple lovers. In contrast, a PR system would divide the pizza based on the vote percentages: 40% of the pizza would be pepperoni, 30% mushrooms, and 30% pineapple. This way, everyone's preferences are represented, and all participants get a slice with their favourite topping.

Proportional Representation aims to create a representative body that accurately reflects the overall distribution of public support for each political party. This system contrasts sharply with majority or plurality systems, which often reward strong parties and penalise weaker ones. In a plurality system, such as that used in the United States, a candidate can win a seat with fewer than half the votes if they receive more votes than any other candidate. This winner-takes-all approach can leave a significant portion of the electorate feeling unrepresented.[35]

The foundation for systematic proportional representation was laid in the mid-19th century by Carl Andrae in Denmark and Thomas Hare[36] and John Stuart Mill in Britain. These pioneers developed methods to ensure that elections more accurately reflected the will of the people. Today, various methods of proportional representation are employed worldwide, including the Single Transferable Vote (STV) method, the party-list system, and the additional-member system. A key distinction from plurality systems is that these methods typically use multi-member constituencies instead of single-member districts. [37]

The view of proportional representation is twofold. Proponents of PR argue that elections should serve as an accurate reflection of public opinion on governance. They highlight how plurality systems can result in unrepresentative minority governments. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the two major parties governed with just over 40% of the vote during the last three decades of the 20th century. Advocates also point out that PR can correct discrepancies in majority or plurality systems, where a party may win more seats with fewer popular votes, as occurred in the British elections of 1951 and February 1974. They believe a truly legitimate assembly must represent the full diversity of viewpoints. On the other hand, critics argue that elections should produce decisive outcomes and that electoral systems should build consensus rather than just count opinions. They contend that PR, by enabling small parties to gain representation, encourages the formation of splinter groups, which can lead to weak and unstable governments.[38]

As more countries continue to implement and refine PR, the debate over its merits and challenges will persist. However, the growing prevalence of PR worldwide highlights a collective recognition of the importance of fair representation in democratic governance. Hitherto, there are close to a hundred countries adopting the PR system, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.[39]

While Malaysia currently utilises the FPTP system, numerous other electoral systems exist globally, each with its unique characteristics. Despite their differences, these systems share a common goal: to ensure that the democratic voice prevails. Like all electoral systems, FPTP has its drawbacks, but so do alternatives. It is prudent to continually strive for the best possible electoral system, potentially incorporating elements from other systems to enhance Malaysia's FPTP framework. However, changing Malaysia’s electoral system to incorporate reforms like RCV or PR would require major changes to the nation’s Constitution and electoral laws. To amend the Constitution, immense political will and broad consensus are necessary to push such electoral reform through the amendment process. Changes to the Elections Act 1958[40] would also be required to address new voting methods, counting procedures, and distinct delineations. Despite the challenges and complexities involved in reforming Malaysia’s electoral system, we must persist in this endeavour to ensure that democracy truly prevails.

4.0 Potential  Solutions for Gerrymandering

Beyond malapportionment, gerrymandering has been a serious issue in achieving fair elections.[41] Gerrymandering involves reshaping electoral districts to create a partisan advantage, ensuring secure seats for a specific party, group, or individual while disadvantaging others.[42] This practice often results in oddly shaped electoral boundaries that obscure the intent to manipulate elections. Addressing gerrymandering is challenging because it requires the majority party to redraw electoral maps in a way that removes their demographic and partisan advantage.[43] Nonetheless, several methods can help eliminate this unfair practice.

4.1 Independent Redistricting Committees

An Independent Redistricting Committee is a body separate from the legislature, tasked with setting election boundaries.[44] This entity should operate without interference, particularly from electoral candidates. The difference between a truly independent committee and a politically influenced one lies in who draws the boundaries and how members are chosen.[45] Ensuring genuine independence in redistricting helps create fairer elections.

A prominent example is Arizona, where, by 2000, voters grew frustrated with legislative control over redistricting.[46] This frustration led to Proposition 106, amending Arizona’s Constitution to establish an independent commission for “fair and competitive congressional and legislative districts”.[47] Arizona’s Constitution mandates that this commission consist of five members, with no more than two from the same political party.[48] Additionally, commissioners are selected through a process that balances partisan interests while ensuring an independent deciding vote.[49]

This approach faced challenges, as in Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,[50] where Arizona’s state legislature contested the commission’s authority, arguing it breached the U.S. Constitution by removing the legislature’s power over districting. However, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s right to transfer redistricting authority to the commission, reinforcing the value of independent committees in preventing gerrymandering. Research shows that independent redistricting committees make elections 4% more competitive than those drawn by legislative plans.[51]

In Malaysia, redistricting is managed by the Election Commission (EC)[52] under Article 113 of the Federal Constitution, which mandates boundary reviews at eight-year intervals.[53] While similar to an independent committee, public confidence in the EC’s neutrality is low.[54] A 2018 survey by the CPPS found that 80.3% of young people felt the EC was neither fair nor independent.[55] For instance, before the 1962 amendment of the Federal Constitution,[56] the EC’s recommendations on electoral boundaries held final and binding authority. However, this changed after the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1962, when Article 116 (3),[57] (4),[58] and (5)[59] were repealed, transferring more power to the legislature in the process of drawing electoral boundaries. Now, the EC’s recommendations must receive approval from the House of Representatives.[60] The Thirteenth Schedule further specifies that the EC’s recommendations must be communicated[61] to the Prime Minister and approved[62] by the House of Representatives. This example clearly shows that the EC is not as independent as it should be.[63] To effectively combat gerrymandering, constitutional reforms are needed to establish an EC that is free from executive influence and capable of making fair decisions that uphold democratic values. 

4.2 Mathematical Methods 

Another solution to gerrymandering is the use of mathematical formulas for setting electoral boundaries. The idea is to rely entirely on objective algorithms, removing any human intervention that might influence the outcome. This approach ensures that boundary creation is based on population distribution, minimising opportunities for partisan manipulation.[64]

One widely discussed method is the shortest splitline algorithm, which divides a population into two equal parts by the shortest possible line, then recursively applies the same process to the resulting subgroups until the required number of districts is reached.[65] This method ensures that district boundaries reflect population distribution rather than political considerations.

For example, if a state has a population that needs to be divided into multiple districts, the algorithm first divides the state into two parts based on equal population. Then, each part is subdivided further until the number of electoral seats matches the population distribution. This method not only minimises human input but also makes it difficult for any party to influence the outcome, as the boundary lines are driven purely by population data.[66] Moreover, the transparency of the algorithm can be enhanced by making it publicly available for verification. If the public can check the algorithm's parameters, it becomes harder for anyone to introduce bias into the process.[67]

In Malaysia, the EC conducts redistricting every eight years based on several principles.[68] These principles include avoiding boundaries that cross state boundaries,[69] considering available facilities for polling day,[70] striving for equal numbers of voters per constituency while accounting for rural areas,[71] and minimising constituency changes to preserve local ties.[72] These guidelines aim to ensure a fair and orderly voting process for all citizens.[73] However, the guidelines are still vulnerable to partisan influence, as demonstrated by the 14th General Election (2018) in Kelantan. According to research conducted by Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, gerrymandering persisted despite the redistricting process adhering to these principles, allowing BN to gain an advantage by making it more challenging for opposition supporters to vote.[74] This influenced the election outcome, with BN winning the Ketereh Parliament seat by a majority of 4,624 votes, a significant increase from the 974-vote majority in the 13th General Election following redistricting.[75] This illustrates how even with constitutional principles in place, political motivations can still shape electoral boundaries.

These methods demonstrate to us that gerrymandering is a solvable problem with enough determination. However, implementing such beneficial changes in our country will not be easy. Fierce opposition might arise from political figures and parties that have long benefited from gerrymandering. Strong political will and effective advocacy are essential to push an effective movement to ensure fairness and justice in upholding democracy.

5.0 Conclusion

Equal representation is not just a guiding principle or theoretical ideal but a mandate to be upheld and protected. This comparative analysis aims to accomplish this by highlighting the diverse range of models found across the globe that Malaysia could take as examples, as well as by recognising the strengths within Malaysia's existing systems. Whether Malaysia chooses to implement instant-runoff voting, Mixed-Member Proportional Representation, or any other system is relatively unimportant, as long as our electoral system continues to improve itself.

Malaysia, with its uniquely diverse racial and ethnic makeup, bears the responsibility of ensuring that all communities are equally represented within the political landscape. Refining these details is not merely a matter of smoothing technicalities for the sake of efficiency and efficacy but a necessity for amplifying the voices that are yet to be heard. If we are to be equal in the eyes of the law, then there is a need for our votes to be equal at the ballot as well.

REFERENCES

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[2]  Tindak Malaysia. (n.d.). Post GE 14.  Tindak Malaysia. Retrieved from <https://www.tindakmalaysia.org/post-ge14-2>. Site accessed on 11 Nov 2024.

[3] Muhammad Yusry (2022, Dec 12). Analysts: Undi18, automatic voter registration have worsened unequal constituency sizes. The Sun. Retrieved from <https://thesun.my/malaysia-news/analysts-undi18-automatic-voter-registration-have-worsened-unequal-constituency-sizes-BH10422012>.  Site accessed on 21 Nov 2024.

[4] National Library Board Singapore. (n.d.). Group Representation Constituency. National Library Board Singapore. Retrieved from <https://www.nlb.gov.sg/main/article-detail?cmsuuid=55ce6567-039d-412f-96b7-c704fe8b5983#:~:text=A%20group%20representation%20constituency%20>. Site accessed on 11 Nov 2024.

[5] Sun, T. W. (2015). Governing Singapore: The Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system and its effect on inclusiveness and electoral participation. Asian Education and Development Studies, 4(3), 282-298.

[6] Elections Department Singapore. (n.d.). Type of Electoral Division. Elections Department Singapore. Retrieved from <https://www.eld.gov.sg/elections_type_electoral.html>. Site accessed on 11 Nov 2024.

[7] Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore) art 39A 1(a).

[8] Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore) art 39A 2(a).

[9] Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore) art 39A 2(c).

[10] The Star. (n.d.). Selangor. The Star GE 15 & 6 States Elections. Retrieved from <https://elections.thestar.com.my/selangor.html>. Site accessed on 12 Nov 2024.

[11] See Footnote 5 above.

[12] Tongbram, U., & Ganguly, A. (2024) Electoral System in Singapore. International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research, 6(2). 

[13] Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. (2013, Aug 27). GRC system and politics of inclusion. Gilian Koh. Retrieved from <https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/pa_gillian_s_-grc-system-and-politics-of-inclusion_2708131.pdf>. Site accessed on 20 Nov 2024.

[14] MARUAH Singapore. (2013, Aug). Defending the Legitimacy of Singapore Elections: MARUAH Position Paper on the GRC system Q3 2013. MARUAH Singapore. Retrieved from

<https://maruah.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/maruah-position-paper-on-the-grc-system1.pdf>. Site accessed on 20 Nov 2024.

[15]  Saalfeld, T. (2005). Germany: Stability and strategy in a mixed-member proportional system. The politics of electoral systems, 209-229.

[16] Federal Electoral Act 1994 (Germany) s 6(1).

[17] Federal Electoral Act 1994 (Germany) s 6(2).

[18] Deutscher Bundestag (n.d.). Election of Members and the allocation of seats. Deutscher Bundestag. Retrieved from <https://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/elections/arithmetic/arithmetic-199936>. Site accessed on 13 Nov 2024.

[19] Federal Electoral Act 1994 (Germany) s 6(3).

[20] The Electoral Knowledge Network (n.d.). Electoral Systems. The Electoral Knowledge Network. Retrieved from <https://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esf03b.htm>. Site accessed on 13 Nov 2024.

[21]  See Footnote 15 above.

[22] See Footnote 20 above.

[23] Linhart, E., Raabe, J., & Statsch, P. (2019). Mixed-member proportional electoral systems–the best of both worlds?. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 29(1), 21-40.

[24] Kambhampaty, A. P.  (2019, Nov 6). New York City Voters Just Adopted Ranked-Choice Voting in Elections. Here’s How It Works. Time Magazine. Retrieved from <https://time.com/5718941/ranked-choice-voting/> Site accessed on 17 November 2024.

[25]  Ranked Choice Voting Resource Centre. (2024). Where is RCV Used?. Ranked Choice Voting Resource Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.rcvresources.org/where-is-rcv-used/>. Site accessed on 7 Nov 2024.

[26] Hamlin, A., Igersheim, H., Durand, H., & Laslier, J. (2023, Apr 21). Different Voting Methods Produce Different—and More Accurate—Results. PROMARKET. Retrieved from <https://www.promarket.org/2023/04/21/different-voting-methods-produce-different-and-more-accurate-results/>. Site accessed on 17 Nov 2024.

[27] Reilly, B. (2002). Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral Innovation and the Borda Count in the Pacific Island Countries. International Political Science Review, 23(4), 355–372. Retrieved from <https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/staff/ben_reilly/ReillyB_05.pdf>.  Site accessed on 17 Nov 2024.

[28] Ranked Choice Voting Resource Centre. (2024). What is Ranked Choice Voting?. Ranked Choice Voting Resource Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.rcvresources.org/what-is-rcv>. Site accessed on 7 Nov 2024.

[29]  See Footnote 25 above. 

[30] Rankedvote. (2024). Understanding Ranked Choice Voting. Rankedvote. Retrieved from <https://www.rankedvote.co/guides/understanding-ranked-choice-voting/pros-and-cons-of-rcv>. Site accessed on 7 Nov 2024.

[31]  Heuvel, K. V. (2021, May 4). Ranked-choice voting is already changing politics for the better. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/04/ranked-choice-voting-is-already-changing-politics-better/>. Site accessed 8 Nov 2024.

[32]  See Footnote 30 above.

[33] See Footnote 30 above.

[34]  Electoral Reform Society. (2017). Proportional Representation. Electoral Reform Society. Retrieved from <https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/what-are-voting-systems/proportional-representation/>. Site accessed 17 Nov 2024.

[35]  Etheredge, L. (2024, Nov 6). Proportional Representation. Britannica. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/proportional-representation >. Site accessed 8 Nov 2024.

[36] Hare, T. (2024, Nov 6). Development of Single Transferable Vote Method. Britannica. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Hare>. Site accessed 8 Nov 2024.

[37]  See Footnote 35 above.

[38]  See Footnote 35 above.

[39]  Ridley-Castle, T. (2023, March 20). How many countries around the world use proportional representation?. Electoral Reform Society. Retrieved from <https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/how-many-countries-around-the-world-use-proportional-representation/>. Site Accessed 8 Nov 2024.

[40]  Elections Act 1958 (Act 19 Rev. 1970) (Malaysia).

[41]  Muller, D. T. (2019). Nonjudicial Solutions to Partisan Gerrymandering. Howard Law Journal, 62(3), 791. Retrieved from <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3579027_code464341.pdf?abstractid=3359739&mirid=1>. Site accessed on 10 Nov 2024.

[42] Lowenthal, A. S. (2019). The Ills of Gerrymandering and Independent Redistricting Commissions as the Solution. Harvard Journal on Legislation, 56(1), 1. Retrieved from <https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jol/wp-content/uploads/sites/86/2019/05/hll102_crop.pdf>. Site accessed on 10 Nov 2024.

[43]  Grant, A., Koenen, K., Mayoras, B., & Rea, N. (2020). Solutions to Racial Gerrymandering. Students for Democracy, 1(1), 12. Retrieved from <https://www.sfdumich.com/_files/ugd/98f1be_fced764d5aa34303b2457f7d53cd284a.pdf>. Site accessed on 10 Nov 2024.

[44]  Campaign Legal Center. (n.d.). Independent Redistricting Commissions. Campaign Legal Center. Retrieved from <https://campaignlegal.org/democracyu/accountability/independent-redistricting-commissions>. Site accessed on 11 Nov 2024.

[45]  Rudensky, Y., & Lo, A. (2019). A Better Way to Draw Districts. Brennan Center for Justice. Retrieved from <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/better-way-draw-districts>. Site accessed on 11 Nov 2024.

[46]  Sonenshein, R. J. (n.d.). When the People Draw the Lines: An Examination of The California Citizens Redistricting Commission. League of Women Voters of California. Retrieved from <https://lwvc.org/when-the-people-draw-the-lines/>. Site accessed on 11 Nov 2024.

[47]  Edwards, B., Sanchez, A., Yeargain, T., Crespin, M., & Hayden, J. (2016). Can Independent Redistricting Commissions Lead Us Out of the Political Thicket. Albany Government Law Review, 9(2), 288, 303-304. Retrieved from: <https://www.albanygovernmentlawreview.org/article/23972-can-independent-redistricting-commissions-lead-us-out-of-the-political-thicket/attachment/60748.pdf>. Site accessed on 11 Nov 2024.

[48] Arizona State Constitution art 4 s 1(2).

[49] See Footnote 47 above. 

[50] Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission [2015] 576 U.S. 787.

[51]  Carson, J. L., Crespin, M. H., & Williamson, R. D. (2014). Reevaluating the Effects of Redistricting on Electoral Competition, 1972-2012. State Politics & Policy Quarterly. 14(2), 16. doi:10.1177/1532440013520245

[52]  Federal Constitution (Malaysia) art 113(2)(i).

[53]  Federal Constitution (Malaysia) art 113(2)(ii).

[54]  Ravinder Singh. (2018, Mar 12). Of course the EC is independent…. Malaysiakini. Retrieved from <https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/415319>. Site accessed on 13 Nov 2024.

[55]  Centre for Public Policy Studies. (2018, May 5). Survey: 80.3pct of youths think EC isn’t fair and independent. Malaysiakini. Retrieved from <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/423254>. Site accessed on 13 Nov 2024.

[56] Constitution (Amendment) Act 1962 (Act 14) (Malaysia) art 116.

[57] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) art 116(3).

[58] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) art 116(4)

[59] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) art 116(5).

[60]  Lee, H. P., (1976). Constitutional Amendments in Malaysia Part I: A Quick Conspectus. Malaya Law Review, 18(1), 59. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24863148>. Site accessed on 12 Nov 2024.

[61] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) Thirteenth Schedule sec 4.

[62] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) Thirteenth Schedule sec 10.

[63]  Ravinder Singh. (2018, Apr 11). The impossibility of ethical and fair elections. Malaysiakini. Retrieved from <https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/419369>. Site accessed on 13 Nov 2024.

[64] Vickrey, W. (1961). On the Prevention of Gerrymandering. Political Science Quarterly, 76(1), 105. doi:2307/2145973.

[65]  RangeVoting.org (n.d.). Gerrymandering and a cure for it – the shortest splitline algorithm (executive summary). RangeVoting.org. Retrieved from <https://www.rangevoting.org/GerryExec.html>. Site accessed on 10 Nov 2024.

[66] RangeVoting.org (n.d.). Examples of our unbiased district-drawing algorithm in action / comparisons with gerrymandered districts drawn by politicians. RangeVoting.org. Retrieved from <https://www.rangevoting.org/GerryExamples.html>. Site accessed on 10 Nov 2024.

[67] CGP Grey. (2011, Jul 12). Gerrymandering Explained. YouTube. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mky11UJb9AY>. Site accessed on 10 Nov 2024.

[68] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) Thirteenth Schedule s 2.

[69] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) Thirteenth Schedule s 2(a).

[70] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) Thirteenth Schedule s 2(b).

[71] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) Thirteenth Schedule s 2(c).

[72] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) Thirteenth Schedule s 2(d).

[73] Junaidi Awang Besar, Mohd Fuad Mat Jali, Rosmadi Fauzi, & Amer Saifude Ghazali. (2012). Pengaruh Gerrymandering Terhadap Pola Pengundian di Kawasan Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN) Kajang dan Bangi, Malaysia. Malaysian Journal of Society and Space, 8(7), 1. Retrieved from <http://journalarticle.ukm.my/5645/>. Site accessed on 13 Nov 2024.

[74] Sharifah Nur Syafiqah. (2022, Oct 14). Adakah Gerimander Dipraktikkan di Malaysia. Malaysia Bersuara. Retrieved from <https://malaysiabersuara.com/artikel/semak-fakta/adakah-gerimander-dipraktikkan-di-malaysia/>. Site accessed on 11 Nov 2024.

[75] See Footnote 74 above.