Hong Kong: Shifting Power and Politics

1.0 INTRODUCTION

When one thinks of Hong Kong, an image of lit-up skyscrapers, neon lights, and bustling nightlife comes to mind. However, its history is not nearly as appealing to tourists as it is now. Modern-day Hong Kong has undergone profound transformation to become what it is today.

Today, Hong Kong, officially known as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People’s Republic of China (HKSAR), is still a subject of debate regarding the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s governance. Its special and unique status as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), has been a subject of contention for its residents, demanding autonomy and independence from the People’s Republic of China. 

1. 1 Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region

The title of Special Administrative Region (SAR) is given to territories with the promise of autonomy, providing separation from China in administrative systems. As promised, Hong Kong reserves the right to manage its own internal affairs, with the exception of defence and foreign affairs being managed by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.[1] Hong Kong operates as a separate entity from the PRC but is still a part of China territorially. From this, comes the principle of ‘One Country, Two Systems’. 

Underpinning this principle is Hong Kong’s de facto Constitution, known as the Basic Law. The Basic Law was enacted under the Constitution of China when it was adopted by the National People's Congress on the 4th of April 1990. At midnight on July 1, 1997, the Basic Law came into effect, officially marking the handover.[2] It was created by the National People’s Congress of the People's Republic of China, and not Hong Kong. It serves as a document that outlines the region’s legal and administrative framework, similar to a traditional constitution. Conversely, it outlines the central government’s role in handling foreign affairs and defence matters, as well as other key protocols in certain political circumstances. 

One of the powers granted to the People’s Republic of China lies within the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) in Beijing which has the final authority to interpret the Basic Law. If conflicts between local laws and the Basic Law infringe upon areas managed by Central Authorities or the relationship between Central Authorities and HK, the NPCSC can reject the law, rendering it invalid.[3] 

1.2 Historical Background of Hong Kong

Modern-day Hong Kong’s political atmosphere is only the tip of the iceberg. Centuries of warfare is what led to what we see today. Before the British, in 214 BCE, the area now known as Hong Kong was incorporated into China for the first time by the Qin Dynasty.[4] After many decades of back-and-forth settlements and dynastic changes, modern-day Hong Kong was left in the hands of the Qing Dynasty.

Then came the drug conflict between the British merchants and the Chinese authorities who wanted to put an end to the Opium trade, and foreign trade altogether.  Private opium stocks owned by British merchants were seized, and a looming threat of the death penalty for future offenders ensured their attempts to grab ahold of China’s trade market would end there.[5] The act of seizing opium from incoming British ships, and with no sight of compensation leading to massive losses for the British government, served as the casus belli for the subsequent war, more often known as the Opium War.[6]

1.3 Under British Rule

After the Qing’s surrender, Hong Kong fell under the control of British forces. After a year, Hong Kong was formally ceded to the United Kingdom in the 1842 Treaty of Nanking.[7] Further expansions began in 1898 as the United Kingdom obtained a 99-year lease of the New Territories.

1.4 The Handover

As the 99-year lease for the New Territories ended, Governor Murray MacLehose raised the question of Hong Kong's status with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in 1979.[8] 

Multiple rounds of negotiations between the two governments led to the United Kingdom agreeing to hand over Hong Kong to China, with China guaranteeing certain levels of autonomy for Hong Kong. The conditions for this agreement were set in paper within the Sino-British Joint Declaration. After 156 years of British rule, Hong Kong was handed over to China, as a Special Administrative Region.

This change did not come without controversy. As the handover approached, concerns over potential erosion of civil rights, the rule of law, and quality of life under Chinese governance led to a wave of emigration. Between the 1980s and the mid-1990s, an estimated half a million to one million Hongkongers relocated abroad, seeking stability and security in countries.[9]

It is unfortunate to say that their fears were not unfounded. 

2.0 HONG KONG’S LEGISLATURE “LEGCO”

The Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo) serves as the city’s lawmaking body,[10] operating under the framework of the Basic Law since 1997. While intended to represent the public, its composition has long been a subject of debate, balancing between democratic participation and centralized control.[11] However, the 2019 protests mark a significant public outcry toward the system, triggered by opposition to a proposed extradition bill.[12] In response, Beijing implemented a series of reforms that fundamentally altered the composition and electoral process of LegCo. 

2.1 LegCo Prior to the 2019 Protest

Before the 2019 protests, LegCo had 70 members, with half elected by the public and half by influential business and professional groups instead.[13] This 70 seats composition was a structure by the 2010 electoral reform and set in place by the 2016 election.[14] Half of these seats formed 35 Geographical Constituencies (GCs) and the other half formed the Functional Constituencies (FCs) and seats from the district council’s functional constituency.[15] The GCs formed the democratic foundation of the council, with representatives directly elected by millions of voters across five districts.[16] In the 2016 elections, pro-democracy candidates secured a total representation of 30 seats in LegCo.[17] This electoral outcome allowed the public to play a meaningful role in legislative debates and promoting democracy in the system.

On the other hand, FCs are less democratic.[18] This is because thirty of these seats were allocated to specific professional and economic sectors, such as finance, law, and shipping, with each having a limited and sometimes only a few hundred voters per seat.[19] For instance, the finance sector had approximately 141 voters in 2021, primarily composed of banking institutions.[20] However, five of FCs seats are called “District Council (Second)” seats, which were nominated by district councilors and elected by general public voters who are not eligible to vote for the other FCs seats.[21] This portion provides a certain level of democratic value to the election of the representative of the FCs.

2.2 LegCo After the 2019 Protest

In 2019, massive protests broke out in Hong Kong, sparked by the proposed controversial extradition bill that would have allowed suspects to be sent to mainland China, raising fears over the erosion of the city’s autonomy and legal freedoms promised under the Basic Law.[22] The peaceful marches escalated into months of clashes between protesters and police.[23] This includes events like the storming of the LegCo building, showing deep frustrations with a political system seen as unrepresentative and Beijing-controlled.[24] Alarmed by this, Beijing responded with the 2020 National Security Law and, in 2021, an overhaul of LegCo by expanding it from 70 to 90 seats and restructuring it to ensure loyalty, fundamentally altering the legislative framework that had existed before.[25] This amendment was made at the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress on 30 March 2021.[26]

Under the current structure, LegCo is now divided into three segments.[27] The GCs have been reduced from 35 to 20 seats, thereby lowering the proportion of publicly elected representatives from 50% to 22%.[28] The 30 FCs remain unchanged and continue to be selected by small representatives from the professional and economic sectors. The most significant alteration is the introduction of 40 Election Committee (EC) seats, which are chosen by a 1,500-member body that is the same body that elects the Chief Executive.[29] This body consists of people such as business leaders, tycoons, elite professionals, religious figures, local leaders, and the Hong Kong delegation to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) chosen by Beijing.[30]

2.3 The Effects of the Changes

The amendment to LegCo has had significant consequences for Hong Kong, particularly by shifting advantages toward a specific group. Here, the competing interests are between pro-Beijing factions, including business elites and loyalists, and the general public alongside pro-democracy supporters. 

The overhaul of LegCo appears to favour pro-Beijing factions and further asserts Beijing's authority over the city.[31] Under the new system, the reduction of GCs’ seats from 35 to 20, shrinks the public’s direct influence from 50% to just 22% of the legislature. The general public now has less influence on the makeup of the legislature. Meanwhile, the 30 FCs’ seats, representing specific professional and business sectors, remained unchanged, thereby preserving the influence of a limited electorate of only around 198,157 voters[32] compared to the 7.4 million population of Hong Kong.[33] Furthermore, the introduction of EC to the LegCo together with FC, further increased the imbalance to the democracy of the system by controlling 78% of the legislature.[34] Not to mention, the selected candidates of the EC and FCs are notoriously pro-Beijing.[35] The EC’s composition, drawn from sectors such as finance, trade, and pro-Beijing unions, ensures that only candidates loyal to Beijing are likely to be chosen. In addition, a strict vetting process now requires all candidates to be approved as “patriots,” effectively barring pro-democracy figures from participating.[36] An illustrative example can be seen in the 2021 election, in which pro-Beijing candidates won 82 of the 90 seats, equivalent to the 91% of the LegCo, showing how the reformed system has effectively locked power into the hands of a small, elite group of pro-Beijing politicians.[37] Not just that, the election also saw 12 pro-democracy candidates barred from running,[38] resulting in the lowest voter turnout in Hong Kong’s history, as only 27.5% of eligible voters participated.[39]

3.0 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ELECTION AND PUBLIC REACTION 

The Chief Executive is the highest-ranking official in Hong Kong’s political system, holding both executive authority and responsibility over the government and the region. As stipulated in Article 43 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), the Chief Executive serves as the head of the government and shall also be accountable to the Central People’s Government in Beijing.[40] This includes leading the administration, implementing laws, managing policies, and ensuring smooth governance while remaining accountable to the central authorities.[41] 

To be eligible for the position, a candidate must be a Chinese citizen over the age of 40, a permanent resident of Hong Kong, and must have resided in the region for more than 20 years.[42] The Chief Executive serves a five-year term and may only be re-elected once, with a maximum of two consecutive terms.[43]

3.1 The Election of the Chief Executive

The election mechanism for the Chief Executive has undergone significant changes, particularly with Beijing’s increasing influence, which has gradually suppressed Hong Kong’s political autonomy and democratic freedoms.

The Chief Executive is not elected by the general public through popular vote but instead by an Election Committee, as prescribed in Annex I of the Basic Law[44] and the Chief Executive Election Ordinance.[45] The Election Committee is responsible for both nominating and electing the Chief Executive.[46] Before 2021, this Election Committee consisted of 1,200 members from four sectors, including commerce, the professions, social services, and political groups.[47] However, following the 2021 electoral reform, the committee was expanded to 1,500 members, introducing a fifth sector primarily composed of representatives from mainland Chinese political bodies, including the National People’s Congress.[48]

The reform was introduced to uphold the principle of “One Country, Two Systems,” aligning with Hong Kong’s political structure while ensuring that only "patriots" administer the city.[49] This principle requires that Hong Kong be governed by individuals who are loyal to both China and Hong Kong.[50] The reform was justified as a means to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests while maintaining Hong Kong’s long-term prosperity and stability.[51]

In order to qualify as a candidate for Chief Executive, an individual must secure at least 188 nominations from Election Committee members, including a minimum of 15 nominations from each of the five sectors.[52] Once nominated, the Election Committee conducts voting through a secret ballot system on a one-person-one-vote basis.[53] However, unlike in Malaysia, where every eligible citizen has the right to vote, the Chief Executive election remains exclusive to the 1,500-member committee.

In order to win the election, a candidate must reach the threshold of at least 750 votes.[54] After securing a majority, the winning candidate must declare within seven working days that they are not a member of any political party and must commit in writing to remaining politically independent throughout their term.[55] The Central People's Government of China then formally appoints the Chief Executive-designate before they take office.[56]

If there are instances where multiple candidates tie for the highest number of votes or if no candidate secures an absolute majority, a run-off election takes place.[57] Voting continues in rounds until a candidate receives more than 750 votes.[58]

3.2 Public Reaction and International Response

3.2.1 Universal Suffrage

Throughout the years, Hong Kong residents, especially pro-democracy supporters have protested for universal suffrage, demanding the right to freely elect their leaders. Universal suffrage means that all adults regardless of background or status have the right to vote.[59] The current system falls short of true democracy, as it only allows 1500 Election Committee members which make up only 0.02% of Hong Kong’s population to vote for the Chief Executive.[60]

One of the significant protests advocating for greater democracy was the Umbrella Movement in 2014. The movement emerged after Beijing announced that only pre-approved candidates could run for Chief Executive. In response to that, pro-democracy activists and thousands of Hong Kong citizens staged large-scale demonstrations, demanding the right to freely elect their leaders without the influence of Beijing.[61]

Another major political protest occurred during the 2019 Anti-Extradition Protests. While the initial focus of this movement was on opposing the extradition bill, it also revolved into democratic reforms. Protestors called for universal suffrage as prescribed in the Basic Law[62] and urged that Hong Kong’s leaders be elected through a full democratic process.[63] 

3.2.2  John Lee’s Election

The election of John Lee Ka-chiu, the fifth and current Chief Executive of Hong Kong, which took place on May 8, 2022, received mixed reactions. Many viewed his victory as a sole candidate of the election a result of direct endorsement by Beijing, rather than a democratic process.[64]

Beijing Liaison Office in Hong Kong described the election as a demonstration of the superiority of the new system and reinforced the principle of “patriots governing Hong  Kong”. It was emphasized that the electoral changes had strengthened democracy in a unique way to Hong Kong and reflected the solemn choice of the Election Committee, representing public opinion.[65] 

However, pro-democracy groups have a different view on this. The spokesperson for activist group Stand with Hong Kong, John Song criticized the election as a  “sham election”, calling on the democratic countries worldwide to refuse the recognition of the process. He further stated that those in Hong Kong who value freedom and democracy would feel increasingly at risk, as John Lee’s continuation of his predecessor’s policies and further alignment of Beijing are expected.[66]

The European Union also expressed disappointment over the election results, urging China and Hong Kong authorities to uphold both national and international commitments, particularly the ultimate goal of electing the Chief Executive and Legislative Council members through universal suffrage.[67]

4.0 ARTICLE 23 AND IMPLICATIONS 

Article 23 of the Basic Law is arguably one of the most controversial provisions within the region’s constitutional framework. Article 23 states:[68]

“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.”

Simply put, it mandates Hong Kong to enact its own national security laws, but critics argue that this could allow the Central People’s Government to exert significant influence over the region’s legal and political landscape under the guise of national security. While the provision mandates that Hong Kong enact its own laws regarding treason, secession, sedition, and subversion, critics argue that the vague and broad nature of these terms could lead to the erosion of civil liberties, freedom of speech, and political dissent within the region.[69]

4.1 Freedom of Speech, Assembly, and Association

One of the primary concerns regarding Article 23 is its potential impact on fundamental freedoms, particularly freedom of speech, assembly, and association. These rights, previously enshrined in Hong Kong's legal system and protected under the Basic Law and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[70] face significant threats if national security laws are enacted under Article 23. The broad and ambiguous definitions of offenses such as "sedition" and "subversion" could be used to criminalise political dissent, peaceful protests, and even academic discussions. In many jurisdictions, sedition laws have historically been employed to suppress opposition voices, and there are fears that Hong Kong could follow a similar path. The introduction of such legislation may lead to increased self-censorship among journalists, scholars, and activists, thereby limiting open discourse and public debate.[71]

The broad and ambiguous definitions of offenses such as "sedition" and "subversion" could be used to criminalise political dissent, peaceful protests, and even academic discussions. In many jurisdictions, sedition laws have historically been employed to suppress opposition voices, and there are fears that Hong Kong could follow a similar path. The introduction of such legislation may lead to increased self-censorship among journalists, scholars, and activists, thereby limiting open discourse and public debate.

Similarly, the prohibition on foreign political organisations engaging in Hong Kong's political affairs could have far-reaching consequences. Many human rights organisations, pro-democracy groups, and international advocacy bodies operate in Hong Kong, and restrictions on their activities could result in further isolation of the city from global democratic movements. Moreover, barring local political groups from establishing ties with foreign organisations may stifle cross-border cooperation and diminish Hong Kong’s role as an international hub for legal and political discourse.

The 2019 anti-extradition bill protests served as a key example of how freedom of speech and assembly have been challenged. The protests began as a response to a proposed law allowing extraditions to mainland China, but they soon evolved into a broader movement demanding greater democracy and autonomy. The movement saw millions of Hongkongers participating in peaceful marches, but also clashes between police and protestors, escalating into violent confrontations. Protestors faced tear gas, rubber bullets, and mass arrests, while authorities labeled the movement as "riots," justifying harsh crackdowns.[72] The protests highlighted the growing concern that Hong Kong’s freedoms were eroding under Beijing’s increasing influence. 

4.2 National Security Law (NSL)

To make the current situation worse, the introduction of the National Security Law (‘NSL’) demonstrated how national security legislation can be used to curtail civil liberties in Hong Kong. Enacted directly by Beijing, the NSL criminalises acts of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces, with penalties as severe as life imprisonment.[73]

One of the most significant incidents occurred on July 1, 2020 — the day after the NSL was passed. This date, traditionally marked by pro-democracy rallies, saw thousands take to the streets despite the risk of arrest. It marked the beginning of a new era of strict political repression. Police arrested hundreds of protesters under the new law, and violent clashes broke out across the city. Many activists later fled Hong Kong or went into hiding — knowing the broad and sweeping powers granted by the NSL made prosecution almost inevitable.[74]

The NSL’s enforcement has led to the arrests of numerous pro-democracy activists, journalists, and opposition lawmakers. Media outlets such as Apple Daily and Stand News[75] were shut down, and political opposition in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council has been effectively dismantled.[76] Given this precedent, concerns have been raised that any law passed under Article 23 — meant to complement the NSL — could extend or even deepen its impact.

Additionally, under the NSL, Beijing has established a national security office in Hong Kong, with the power to oversee cases it deems particularly serious.[77] This has further undermined Hong Kong’s judicial independence, as some cases have been handled outside the traditional legal system.[78] If Article 23 legislation aligns with the NSL, it could institutionalise mainland-style legal practices in Hong Kong, further eroding the “One Country, Two Systems” framework.[79]

4.3 Public Reaction and International Response

Public opposition to Article 23 is not new. The last major attempt to introduce national security legislation under Article 23 in 2003 led to massive protests, with over 500,000 people taking to the streets. This widespread backlash ultimately forced the government to pause the passage of the bill. However, the political landscape has changed significantly since then, with the NSL already imposing stringent restrictions on public dissent.[80]

Despite this, concerns over a renewed attempt to pass Article 23 laws continue to spark debate. Pro-democracy activists, legal scholars, and civil society organisations warn that new legislation could further suppress Hong Kong’s political freedoms. Meanwhile, pro-Beijing officials argue that such laws are necessary to maintain stability and prevent foreign interference.

On the international stage, the introduction of national security laws in Hong Kong has drawn widespread condemnation. Countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have criticised the NSL and warned that further legal restrictions under Article 23 could lead to diplomatic consequences, economic sanctions, and further erosion of Hong Kong’s special trade status.[81] The European Union and human rights organisations like Amnesty International[82] and Human Rights Watch[83] have also voiced concerns about the shrinking space for civil liberties in Hong Kong.

As discussions surrounding Article 23 continue, the future of Hong Kong’s autonomy remains uncertain. If enacted, a national security law under Article 23 could mark yet another turning point in Hong Kong’s transformation from a semi-autonomous region to a system increasingly aligned with mainland China’s model of governance. The question remains whether local and international pressure can influence the Hong Kong government’s decision or if Beijing’s tightening grip will leave little room for negotiation.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The future of the “one country, two systems” model remains highly contested. On one side, top Chinese officials and Hong Kong leaders such as Justice Minister Paul Lam insist that the model will continue indefinitely—even beyond 2047. They point to President Xi Jinping’s assurances that the current system is sound and that maintaining a high degree of autonomy is essential for Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity.[84]

However, on the ground, the situation is far more complicated. Since the National Security Law was imposed in 2020, Hong Kong has witnessed a rapid erosion of civil liberties and political freedoms. Harsh sentences—including jail terms of up to ten years for pro-democracy activists—have effectively silenced dissent and decimated opposition groups.[85] 

The recent disbanding of major pro-democracy parties further underscores the shrinking space for political participation, signaling a dramatic shift in the city’s political landscape.[86] 

Recent surveys reveal a divided public sentiment: while many Hong Kongers still express an emotional connection to China, nearly half view the mainland’s growing influence as a major threat to their city’s autonomy.[87] Critics argue that the broad, vague provisions of the security law are being used to suppress peaceful political activities, thereby undermining the pluralistic society promised during the 1997 handover.

Internationally, the United States, the European Union, Australia, and Taiwan have condemned these measures, arguing that they breach the “50 years unchanged” promise and jeopardize Hong Kong’s status as a global financial hub. Beijing, however, dismisses such criticisms as unwarranted interference in its internal affairs.[88]

Ultimately, while official rhetoric portrays “one country, two systems” as an enduring and successful framework, for many residents the model is increasingly synonymous with diminishing freedoms and centralized control. The system’s future will depend on whether Beijing can reconcile its tightening grip with the democratic aspirations of Hong Kong’s people—or whether the growing contradictions will eventually lead to a collapse of the promised autonomy.

REFERENCES

[1] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 12, 13, 14.

[2] Chan, Johannes (2015). "From Colony to Special Administrative Region". Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (2nd ed.)

[3] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 158, 159.

[4] Becky Little  (2023, May 23). How Hong Kong Came Under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Rule. history.com. Retrieved from <https://www.history.com/news/hong-kong-china-great-britain>. Site accessed on 13 March 2025. 

[5] The National Archives. Hong Kong and the Opium Wars. The National Archives. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/hong-kong-and-the-opium-wars/>. Site accessed on 13 March 2025. 

[6] See footnote 5. 

[7] History.com Editors  (2024, Jan 19). Hong Kong ceded to the British. history.com. Retrieved from <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/hong-kong-ceded-to-the-british>. Site accessed on 13 March 2025. 

[8] Andrew Craig-Bennett (2010, Sep 3). The negotiations leading to the Joint Declaration. Gwulo Old Hong Kong. Retrieved from <https://gwulo.com/node/6197>. Site accessed on 13 March 2025. 

[9] Christopher K. Tong (2022). “Hong Kong is Our Home”: Hong Kongers Twenty-Five Years After the Handover. Volume 27:3 (Non-Thematic Issue).

[10] Tai, Benny. (2007). Basic Law, Basic Politics: The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong. Hong Kong Law Journal, 37, 503. Retrieved from <https://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/87971/1/content.pdf?accept=1>. Site accessed on 12 March 2025. 

[11] Ma Ngok. (2007). Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

[12] Ming-sho Ho. (2020). How Protests Evolve: Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Movement and Lessons Learned from the Umbrella Movement. Mobilization, 25(1), 711. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-25-5-711>. Site accessed on 13 March 2025.

[13] See footnote 11. 

[14] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong). Annex II.

[15] Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. (n.d.). A Companion to the history, rules and practices of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Part I: An introduction to the Legislative Council, its history, organisation and procedure. Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved at <https://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/procedur/companion/chapter_3/chapter_3.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com>. Site accessed on 19 March 2025.

[16] See footnote 14.

[17] Al-Jazeera. (2016, Sep 5). Pro-democracy groups gain ground in Hong Kong election. Al-Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/9/5/pro-democracy-groups-gain-ground-in-hong-kong-election>. Site accessed on 13 March 2025.

[18] Cheng, K. (2019, Jul 7). Explainer: How Hong Kong’s legislature was broken, long before protesters invaded the complex. Hong Kong Free Press. Retrieved at <https://hongkongfp.com/2019/07/07/explainer-hong-kongs-legislature-broken-long-protesters-invaded-complex/>. Site accessed on 13 March 2025.

[19] See footnote 14.

[20] The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. (2022, Aug 22). Voter Registration Statistics 2021. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Retrieved at <https://www.voterregistration.gov.hk/eng/statistic20213.html>. Site accessed on 14 March 2025. 

[21] The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. (2012, Feb 2017). Press Release: Voter Registration Arrangements for District Council (Second) Functional Constituency. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Retrieved at <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201202/17/P201202170159.htm>. Site accessed on 14 March 2025. 

[22] Ramzy, A. (2019, Jun 9). Hong Kong March: Vast Protest of Extradition Bill Shows Fear of Eroding Freedoms. The New York Times. Retrieved at <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-protest.html>. Site accessed on 14 March 2025. 

[23] Yeung, J., Sidhu, S., & Wright, R. (2019, Aug 26). A gun shot, petrol bombs and water cannons mark violent escalation in Hong Kong protest. CNN World. Retrieved at <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/25/asia/hong-kong-protest-aug-25-intl-hnk/index.html>. Site accessed on 14 March 2025.

[24] Westcott, B., Yeung, J., Griffiths, J., Hollingsworth, J., George, S., & Jenni M. (2019, Aug 31). Hong Kong protesters storm government building over China extradition bill. CNN World. Retrieved at <https://edition.cnn.com/asia/live-news/hong-kong-july-1-protests-intl-hnk/index.html>. Site accessed on 14 March 2025.

[25] See footnote 14.

[26] See footnote 14.

[27] See footnote 14.

[28] Davis, M. C. (2022, Feb 25). Hong Kong after the Legislative Council Election. The National Bureau of Asian Research. Retrieved at <https://www.nbr.org/publication/hong-kong-after-the-legislative-council-election/>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025. 

[29] See footnote 14.

[30] See footnote 14.

[31] Reuters. (2021, May 27). Hong Kong passes sweeping pro-China election rules, reduces public’s voting power. Reuters. Retrieved at <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/patriots-rule-hong-kong-sweeping-pro-beijing-electoral-rules-passed-2021-05-27/>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025.

[32] The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. (2024, Sep 25). Voter Registration Statistics 2024. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Retrieved at <https://www.voterregistration.gov.hk/eng/statistic2024_fc_dist.html>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025. 

[33] Worldometer. (n.d.). Hong Kong Population. Worldometer. Retrieved at <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-hong-kong-sar-population/>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025.

[34] Davis, M. C. (2022, Feb 25). Hong Kong after the Legislative Council Election. The National Bureau of Asian Research. Retrieved at <https://www.nbr.org/publication/hong-kong-after-the-legislative-council-election/>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025. 

[35] Ramzy, A. (2021, Dec 18). How Hong Kong’s ‘Patriots Only’ Elections Bolster Beijing’s Grip. The New York Times. Retrieved at <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/18/world/asia/hong-kong-patriots-elections.html>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025.

[36] Griffiths, J. (2021, Mar 30). Beijing passes new ‘patriot’ election law for Hong Kong that restricts opposition. CNN World. Retrieved at <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/30/asia/china-hong-kong-elections-intl-hnk>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025.

[37] BBC. (2021, Dec 20). Hong Kong: Pro-Beijing candidates sweep controversial LegCo election. BBC. Retrieved at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59717343>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025. 

[38] Tsoi, G. (2020, July 30). Hong Kong bars 12 opposition candidates from election. BBC. Retrieved at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53593187>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025.

[39] Cho, E., & Kam, D. (2023, Dec 11). Hong Kong ‘patriots only’ e;ection falls flat with record low turnout. Reuters. Retrieved at <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-patriots-only-election-falls-flat-with-record-low-turnout-2023-12-11/>. Site accessed on 15 March 2025.

[40] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 43.

[41] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 48.

[42] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 44.

[43] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 46.

[44] Annex I of The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong).

[45] Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569) (Hong Kong).

[46] Annex I of The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 1.

[47] Wei, C. & Hu, T. (2021, Mar 11). 2021 NPC Session: NPC’s Hong Kong Electoral Overhaul Decision Explained. NPC Observer. Retrieved from <https://npcobserver.com/2021/03/2021-npc-session-npcs-hong-kong-electoral-overhaul-decision-explained/ >. Site accessed on 11 March 2025.

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[49] CMAB. (2021, Mar 17). Improve Electoral System Ensure Patriots Administering Hong Kong. CMAB. Retrieved from <https://www.cmab.gov.hk/improvement/filemanager/content/pdf/en/resource-centre/booklet.pdf>. Site accessed on 11 March 2025.  

[50] Liao, Y., & Meng, L. (2021). 'Patriots Governing Hong Kong And the Innovation of Practice Path to Cultivate the Chinese National Community Consciousness. Journal of Social and Political Sciences, 4(4). 

[51] See footnote 49.  

[52] Annex I of The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 6.

[53] Annex I of  The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 7.

[54] Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569) (Hong Kong) s. 26A(3), 27.

[55] Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569) (Hong Kong) s. 31.

[56] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 45.

[57] Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569) (Hong Kong) s. 27(2)(b). 

[58] Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569) (Hong Kong) s. 27(1).

[59] Domin, M. (2022, June). Universal Suffrage. Oxford Constitutional Law. Retrieved from <https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e688>. Site accessed on 12 March 2025.

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[62] The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong) art 45.

[63] Amnesty International. (2019, Sep 24).Hong Kong’s protests explained. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protests-explained/>. Site accessed on 12 March 2025.

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[66] See footnote 65.

[67] Council of the EU. (2022, May 8). Hong Kong: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the Chief Executive election held on 8 May. Council of the EU and the European Council. Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/08/hong-kong-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-chief-executive-election-held-on-8-may/>. Site accessed on 14 March 2025.

[68] Article 23 of The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).

[69] NBC News. (2024, March 19). Hong Kong’s Article 23: Rights Groups Say Freedoms Threatened as New Law Enacted. Retrieved from <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hong-kong-article-23-rights-threatened-law-enacted-rcna144396?form=MG0AV3>. Site accessed on 11 March 2025.

[70] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

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